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Challenges to Crowdfunding Offering
Disclosures: What Grade Will Your Offering
Disclosure Get?
ABSTRACT
Crowdfunding is a term used in many different contexts. The conversation
surrounding crowdfunding encompasses diverse considerations and
interests.
In its broadest sense, crowdfunding is a technological
fundraisingmedium for businesses, projects, or charitable causes. Instead
of dealing with afinancial institution or specific angel investors or venture
capitalfunds, crowdfunded start-ups try to raise money from a worldwide
"crowd." Some crowdfunding campaigns solicit donations and pre-orders,
such as Kickstarter or Gofundme. Others sell securities. This Comment
will only address the rules that apply to crowdfunding campaigns which
offer securities.
Securities laws have two prime directives. First, companies can only offer
and sell securities in a registeredoffering or in an offering that satisfies the
requirements of an exemption from registration. Second, these businesses
must not misstate materialfacts or omit material facts if the omission
would make its other disclosures misleading to investors.
Primarily, the JOBS Act and other crowdfunding laws focus on the first
prime directive. They create exemptions from registration that allow
businesses to crowdfund, utilize general solicitation and, in some cases,
offer and sell securities to non-accreditedinvestors. These new exemptions
present exciting and importantchanges that democratize the capital raising
process by allowing new subsets of businesses to communicate with a
broaderinvestor base than ever before.
This Comment will briefly discuss these updated exemptions with a
particularfocus on Title II of the JOBS Act and the related SEC Rule
506(c), as well as Title IV of the JOBS Act and what some call Regulation
A+. Both Rule 506 (c) and Regulation A+ are revolutionary because they
change who may talk to investors and the technologies that may be used to
reach them. The primary focus of this Comment is to discuss these
securities laws' requirements for disclosures to investors in light of the
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On their face, the updated
brave new world crowdfunding offers.
exemptions change very little about what issuers must say to investors. The
disclosure challenges posed by the updated exemptions affect new issuers
who have little prior disclosure experience and may have very low
compliance budgets. These challenges require such new issuers to comply
with traditionalsecurities disclosure rules when they are talking to a less
sophisticated crowd of investors than ever before utilizing new
technological platforms that are constantly evolving. This Comment
discusses how and why an issuer taking advantage of these updated
exemptions might inadvertently violate securities disclosure laws when the
speaker changes, the audience changes, or the disclosure platform
changes, and how to avoid potential traps these changes create when
pairedwith newly availabledisclosureplatforms.
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INTRODUCTION
"We have only started on our development of our country-we have not as

"

yet, with all our talk of wonderful progress, done more than scratch the
surface.
Innovation is not new. Technological, business, and legal innovations
were as much a part of the first decades of America in the twentieth century
as of the first decades of twenty-first century America. Based on the
lessons learned from past innovation, we know it is highly likely that
innovation will cause a chain reaction of changes, and that legal change
usually lags behind changes in both technology and business. Further,
when laws finally change, it causes even more technology and businesses
change that require even more legal change. If we keep this interaction of
technological, business, and legal innovation in mind as we analyze the
state of the JOBS Act and the changes in securities laws, we will
understand that the JOBS Act and SEC rules implementing the JOBS Act
are merely the first steps in the race of securities laws to keep up with
technological and business changes.
The turn of the twenty-first century has brought with it the advent of
new technology, which has led to exponential growth of start-ups and
emerging businesses. These businesses inevitably need operating capital.
One would think that with such quick development of technology, the
regulations governing the raising of capital and selling of securities would
develop equally as fast. One would be wrong.
Until recently, emerging and growing businesses raised capital in
private offerings under the traditionally restrictive principles of Regulation
D.2 These legal principles were created during the early 1980's and were

1. HENRY FORD WITH SAMUEL CROWTHER, My LIFE AND WORK 1 (The Floating Press
2009) (1922).
2. November 2011 saw the idea of easing SEC regulations for small businesses gain
traction in Congress. A number of bills aimed at the topic were discussed, ultimately
leading to the passage of the JOBS Act of 2012 on Mar. 27, 2012. See Capital Raising
Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2011, S. 1970, 112th
Cong. (2011); Access to Capital for Job Creators Act, H.R. 2940, 112th Cong. (2011);
Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. (2011); Small Company
Capital Formation Act of 2011, H.R. 1070, 112th Cong. (2011); Democratizing Access to
Capital Act of 2011, S. 1791, 112th Cong. (2011).
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updated only in minor ways during the 1990's. Many changes have
occurred in both technology and business since the SEC introduced
Regulation D's primary principles: (1) businesses cannot make a general
solicitation in a private offering; 3 and (2) offers and sales are prohibited in
private offerings to people who are not wealthy or sophisticated.4 These
two well-meaning principles caused two major problems. First, it was
difficult to raise capital when businesses could not tell investors they were
selling securities.5 Second, institutional investors, venture capital funds,
and a relatively small group of wealthy individuals obtained a virtual
monopoly on buying securities in private offerings-even most accredited
investors were unaware of most private offerings because of the prohibition
This monopoly lowered valuations of
against general solicitation.
businesses raising capital and excluded both non-accredited investors and
most accredited investors from buying securities before they increased in
value after public offerings.
Titles II, 111,6 and IV of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS)
Act of 20127 and state crowdfunding laws redress the general solicitation

3. See SEC Rule 501, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (2015) (defining accredited
investors who are "natural person[s]" as those who have an individual or joint net worth of
over $1 million, or have made over $200,000 per year, or $300,000 per year along with their
spouse).
4. Employing data from the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a triannual
survey conducted by the Federal Reserve, Rachita Gullapalli, a financial economist with the
SEC's Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, estimates that only 3.5% of American
households qualify as "accredited investors." Rachita Gullapalli, Accredited Investor Pool:
Forum on Small Business Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (NOV.
20, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum 112014-gullapalli.pdf [https://perma.
cc/6B3J-Y4G2].
5. SEC Rule 502 provides that "general solicitation" of offers to buy securities
includes, but is not limited to: "(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other
communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast over
television or radio; and (2) Any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by
any general solicitation or general advertising." SEC Rule 502, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)
(2015). This is contrasted with product advertising or "factual business information"
described in SEC Rule 169. See SEC Rule 169, 17 C.F.R. § 230.169(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (2015)
(providing that factual business information includes "[flactual information about the issuer,
its business or financial developments, or other aspects of its business;
and . .. [a]dvertisements of, or other information about, the issuers products or services").
6. As this Comment was being finalized, the SEC's rules regarding equity
crowdfunding under Title III of the JOBS Act became effective on May 16, 2016.
Discussion of these rules will be for another article, but many of the disclosure strategies
and best practices proposed by this Comment can be imported into offerings utilizing the
new crowdfunding rules. The SEC has issued investor guidance bulletins on the new rules.
See Investor Bulletin: Crowdfundingfor Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
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problem. 8 Titles II and IV of the JOBS Act and state crowdfunding
regulations also redress the accredited investor problem.9 As discussed
above, this Comment focuses on Title II of the JOBS Act and related SEC
Rule 506(c) and Title IV of the JOBS Act and related SEC Regulation A+.
Rule 506(c) did not make any changes to SEC disclosure requirements
while Regulation A+ made only modest changes to disclosure
requirements. Disclosure strategy is like any other issue; it is a mixture of
law and facts. If the facts change, different decisions will be made about
how the law applies. Important facts that affect how disclosure rules apply
require crowdfunded businesses to consider: (1) who is communicating; (2)
with whom they are communicating; and (3) how they are communicating.
This new regulation allows emerging businesses to take advantage of
two tiers: Tier I and Tier II. Tier I allows for issuers to raise up to $20
million during any twelve-month period, and Tier II allows for up to $50
million to be raised during the same such period. 10 Both tiers allow offers
2
Rule
to unaccredited investors," and issuers may "test the waters".'
506(k)(1) and Regulation A+ have wide-reaching effects: they open the
world of private securities offerings to the general public, they allow
issuers to raise capital from a wide reaching and previously-untapped
market of unaccredited investors, and they permit use of any media sources
available to sell securities.

https://www.sec.gov/oiealinvestor-alerts-bulletins/ibcrowdfunding-.html [https://perma.cc/
7AD8-LKAM] (last visited May 17, 2016).
7. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
8. Id.

9. Id.
10. Compare Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the
Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,895 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 1) (creating Tier 1 ($20 million) and Tier 2 ($50 million) Regulation
A+ exemptions), with Small Business Initiatives 57 Fed. Reg. 36,442, 36,468 (Aug. 13,
1992) (former Regulation A) (providing only $5 million exemption in a twelve-month
period).
11. See SEC Rule 251, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d) (2015) (outlining offering conditions for
"natural persons" and others).
12. "Testing the waters" is a disclosure similar to a "general solicitation" of offers to
buy securities. It involves an issuer filing SEC Form I-A, which seeks the qualification of
the offering statement. The issuer can "test the waters" by communicating with investors
before and after filing the form. This "testing the waters" period is aimed at gauging market
interest and projected investor response by garnering non-binding expressions of interest.
Once the form is approved, the issuer may make sales of securities to contacted investors.
See SEC Rule 255, 17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (2015) (describing Regulation A+ "Solicitations of
interest and other communications").
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The greater fraud boundaries triggered in communications to investors
have not changed in the new regulations,13 but the media and practices of
soliciting and disclosing are in constant flux. As discussed above, because
both rules permit general solicitations and Regulation A+ permits
businesses to sell to non-accredited investors, issuers will be using new
communications media to reach a much broader audiencel 4 that will on
average be less wealthy and less sophisticated than has traditionally been
the case in unregistered offerings. In addition, the relatively low cost of
modem media will enable many new issuers to conduct offerings.' 5
This major shift in the types of issuers, the audience of potential
investors and the means of communication will undoubtedly pose many
disclosure challenges at their intersection. Businesses must undertake
greater efforts to help investors understand their investment to both drive
future investment, as well as avoid misleading investors. Therefore, this
Comment will discuss how to make disclosures in a general solicitation to
both accredited and unaccredited investors. Part I summarizes the principal
changes the JOBS Act made to exemptions from registration under the
Securities Act of 1933 and summarizes key provisions of Regulation A+
and Rule 506(c). Part II discusses general disclosure principles that apply
to exempt offerings, including Rule 506 (c) and Regulation A+ offerings.
Finally, Part III discusses practical ways for issuers to minimize their
liability risk and liability if they have limited disclosure compliance
budgets, but still seek to utilize new technologies in making solicitations of
offers and in making disclosures.

13. See id. (stating that "testing the waters" or "solicitation of interest" communications
are "deemed to be an offer of a security for sale for purposes of the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws").
14. Facebook had 1.55 billion users in the third quarter of 2015. Facebook: Number of
Monthly Active Users Worldwide 2008-2015, STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/
[https://perna.cc/
statistics/2648 1 0/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide
S4NJ-A2WD] (last visited May 9, 2016). Twitter had 307 million monthly active users in
the third quarter of 2015. Twitter: Number of Monthly Active Users Worldwide 2010-2015,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-of-monthly-active-twitter-use
STATISTA,
rs/ [https:// perma.cc/T4DM-6XJH]. To put this into perspective, there are an estimated
323.50 million people in the United States, and 7.30 billion people on earth as of May 9,
2016. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
popclock/ [https:// perma.cc/KDB6-F7X8] (last visited May 9, 2016). There are roughly
2.93 billion internet users on earth, and 279.83 million in the United States. The World
Factbook, CENT.

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-

world-factbook/geos/xx.html [https:// perma.cc/NPL3-TWV6] (last visited May 9, 2016).
Roughly one in three people on earth uses the internet; one in five uses Facebook monthly,
and one in twenty-four uses Twitter monthly.
15. See generally supra note 13.
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NEW OPTIONS FOR SEC REGISTRATION EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE

JOBS ACT OF 2012
The Securities Act of 1933, as amended (1933 Act) required all sales
of securities to be either registered pursuant to section 5 of the 1933 Act or
qualify for an exemption from registration.' 6 Exemptions from registration
are listed in sections 317 and 418 of the 1933 Act. Exemptions from
registration fall into three general categories: (1) exempt securities listed in
section 3(a) of the 1933 Act, (2) exempt transactions listed under section
3(b) of the 1933 Act, and (3) exempt transactions listed under section 4 of
the 1933 Act.1 9
The JOBS Act of 2012 provided updated avenues for businesses
seeking SEC registration exemptions. 20 It did so by amending parts of
sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act to either create new exemptions from
registration or modify existing exemptions from registration as follows: (1)
Title II of the JOBS Act directed the SEC to create a new Rule 506 (c)
under section 4 of the 1933 Act; (2) Title III of the JOBS Act amended
section 4 of the 1933 Act to add new section 4(6), which creates Federal
crowdfunding; and (3) Title IV of the JOBS Act amended section 3 (b) of
the 1933 Act to direct the SEC to greatly expand old Regulation A, which
is known as Regulation A+. 21
The first of these changes came in the form of SEC Rule 506(c),
which became effective September 23, 2013, allowing issuers to raise
unlimited amounts of capital using general solicitations, so long as all sales
were made only to verified accredited investors. 22 Second, Title III
mandated federal crowdfunding offerings of up to $1 million on highly
regulated crowdfunding portals, for which the SEC issued proposed rules in
July 2014.23 Third, Title IV mandated new Regulation A+, which became
effective June 20, 2015, and revitalized former Regulation A by allowing
16. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 5, 48 Stat. 74, 77 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 77e (2012)).
17. Id. § 3, 48 Stat. at 75 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012)).
18. Id. § 4, 48 Stat. at 77 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012)).
19. Id.
20. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012).
21. Id.
22. SEC Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).
23. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a), 126
Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012)). The SEC adopted final rules on
October 30, 2015 that went into force on May 16, 2016. Again, Title III rules were just
becoming effective at the time of the finalization of this Comment, thus they are outside its
scope. See supra note 6.
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for two tiers of offerings up to $50 million, the ability to generally solicit
offers to buy securities, and the sales of securities to unaccredited investors.
There are similar laws in approximately two dozen states that exempt
intrastate investment crowdfunding offerings to both accredited and
unaccredited investors, allow for general solicitation, and provide a limit of
$1 million to $2 million per twelve-month period.2 4
A. Title II-MandatedRule 506 Exemptions
Rule 506 of Regulation D2 5 is a "safe harbor" for the private offering
exemption of section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Act. 2 6 Companies relying upon
Rule 506 exemption can raise an unlimited amount of money.2 7 There are
two distinct exemptions encompassed in Rule 506, under subsections (b)
and (c) of the Rule.
i. Rule 506(b) Offerings

Subsection (b) offerings are not permitted to use general solicitation or
advertising to market securities. 2 8 The issuer may, however, sell securities
to an unlimited number of accredited investors, and up to thirty-five other

24. Such intrastate exemptions, although not the focus of this Comment, have some,
though minimal, effect on the commercial landscape, due to the need for the States to
comply with the so-called 80-80-80 rule of SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 which
mandates: (1) the issuer derive at least 80% of its and its subsidiaries' gross revenues from
the state; (2) the issuer have at least 80% of its and its subsidiaries' assets located within the
state; and (3) the issuer intend to use and use at least 80% of the net proceeds from sales
made pursuant to the rule in connection with the operating of a business or the purchase of
real property within the state. SEC Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2015). Needless to say,
this restricts the benefit of such exemptions, and they are rarely used by businesses having a
more than nominal interstate presence. For a frequently updated survey and summary of
such intrastate exemptions, see Intrastate Crowdfunding Directory, N. AM. SEC. ADMINS.
Ass'N, http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/instrastate-crowdfund
ing-resource-center/intrastate-crowdfunding-directory/ [https://perma.cc/DD3Y-D6PC] (last
visited May 9, 2016). There are also state-level Blue Sky Laws requiring compliance. For
discussion of such laws, James J. Cronin Ill, Comment, Access to Capital:Rethinking Local
Crowdfunding, 38 CAMPBELL L. REv. 365 (2016).
25. SEC Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).
26. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 3, 48 Stat. 74, 75 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77c (2012)).
27. Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.
sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm [https://perma.cc/C6QY-FVMQ] (last updated Oct. 6, 2014);
see also State v. Casper, 297 S.W.3d 676, 686 (Tenn. 2009).
28. Rule 506 ofRegulation D, supra note 27.
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purchasers. 29 These thirty-five non-accredited investors must meet a
"sophistication" requirement in order to qualify as purchasers.3 0
Disclosures to accredited investors under subsection (b) are
scrutinized less stringently, and must only comply with the anti-fraud
prohibitions of federal securities laws. 3 1 However, for non-accredited,
"sophisticated" investors, the disclosures may be more stringently
scrutinized as the issuer must show the investor had sufficient knowledge
and expertise in financial and business matters. 3 2 Non-accredited investors
must also receive all disclosures accredited investors receive.33 Companies
must also be available to answer questions by prospective purchasers and
provide financial statementS 34 to a Rule 5053s standard. 3 6
To better understand advertising and general solicitations, look to
Rule 502(c) which is incorporated into Rule 506(b) offerings, but is not
incorporated into Rule 506(c) offerings. "[N]either the issuer nor any
person acting on its behalf shall offer or sell securities by any form of

29. Id.
30. Id "Sophistication" means that the non-accredited investor, either alone, or
combined with the expertise of her purchaser representative, has such knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters that she is capable of evaluating the merits and
risks of the prospective investment. SEC Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2015).
Such a subjective and mutable standard, placed upon the issuer, is not necessarily the
clearest, which has led many platforms to focus upon either offering solely to accredited
investors who are more objectively verifiable, or to opt for a Rule 506(c) offering. See
Mark v. FSC Sec. Corp., 870 F.2d 331, 336-37 (6th Cir. 1989) (placing the burden of proof
on the issuer to subjectively verify that each individual non-accredited investor is
sufficiently sophisticated).
31. SEC Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).
32. Id.
33. Id
34. See SEC v. Empire Dev. Grp., LLC, No. 07-CV-03896, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43509, at *24--26 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2008) (finding that the 506(b) issuer who failed to
provide adequate financial statements to unaccredited investors did not qualify for Rule
506(b) exemption and was thus in violation of the SEC requirement of registration or
compliance with a registration exemption).
35. SEC Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2015).
36. Id The following standard applies for providing financial statements under Rule
505 and Rule 506(b): (1) Financial statements must be certified by an independent public
accountant; (2) if a company other than a limited partnership cannot obtain audited financial
statements without unreasonable effort or expense, only the company's balance sheet must
be audited; and (3) limited partnerships unable to obtain required financial statements
without unreasonable effort or expense may furnish audited financial statements under
federal income tax laws. Rule 505 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule505.htm [https://perma.cc/TMY8-EZLD] (last updated Oct.
27, 2014).
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Rule 502(c) gives

examples of prohibited practices, which include advertisements, articles,
notices, and other communications published in any newspaper, magazine,
or similar media or broadcast over television or radio, and any seminar or
meeting whose attendees have been invited by general solicitation or
general advertising.38
ii. Rule 506(c) Offerings

Subsection (c) offerings, in comparison, allow companies to take
advantage of general solicitations.39 Such solicitations are conditioned on
the issuer ensuring: (1) investors in the offering are all accredited investors;
and (2) the issuer has taken reasonable steps to verify its investors are
accredited investors, which could include reviewing documentation, such
as W-2s, tax returns, bank and brokerage account statements, credit reports,
and similar documentation. 4 0 Thus, solicitations may be made to the
general public, if the issuer takes the necessary precautions to ensure
purchasers are accredited. Of course, the representations made in such
solicitations must still comply with federal securities regulations, which are
discussed further infra.
The updates to Rule 506(c) may be the biggest change in securities
laws in several decades. The rule creates the first private placement in
which a company can conduct a general solicitation and advertise without
prior review and approval of disclosure documents at either the federal or

37. SEC Rule 502, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2015).
38. Id. Since Rule 502(c) pre-dates the internet, it does not specifically mention
websites and social media, but these newer media are also prohibited by Rule 502(c).
39. SEC Rule 506(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2015).
40. Id. Platforms facilitating Rule 506(c) offerings oftentimes will only allow access to
investors upon advance verification that they are accredited, in order to ease compliance
with this requirement. For an example of such a platform's website layout, disclaimer, and
verification procedure, see MALARTU, https://malartufunds.us/preview [https://perma.cc/LS
5S-VX2L] (last visited May 9, 2016). The Malartu website states:
DISCLAIMER:
Due to current securities regulation, investments listed on Malartu are only
available to Accredited Investors. Investing in startups carries a high degree
of risk. In general, financial and operating risks confronting both early and
developmental-stage companies, as well as more mature expansion-stage
companies are significant. Many emerging growth companies go out of
business[] every year. It is difficult to know how companies will grow, if at
all, or what changes may occur in the market. A loss of an investor's entire
investment is possible and no profit may be realized. Investors are
responsible for conducting their own due diligence.
Id.
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state levels. 4 1 This is why Rule 506(c) created a new type of offering-the
Public Private Placement. Though Rule 506(c) contains no direct statement
permitting advertising or general solicitations, the SEC backed into
allowing general solicitations by not including the same cross reference to
Rule 502(c) that prohibits advertising and general solicitations that Rule
506(b) had and continues to have. This indirect way of giving permission
to advertise and solicit generally might reflect the fact that the SEC only
approved Rule 506(c) because Congress and the President required it in
Title II of the JOBS Act of July 2012. Because the SEC was directed to
approve Rule 506(c), it will probably strictly enforce accredited investor
verification rules and anti-fraud provisions that relate to what is said in
advertising and how it is said.
The SEC's release that issued Rule 506(c) makes it clear that
crowdfunded companies must satisfy two separate tests if they want to rely
on Rule 506(c) to advertise or conduct a general solicitation.42 The first
test is the same as in Rule 506(b). 43 By incorporating Rule 501(a), 4 4 yOU
meet the test for an accredited investor in one of two ways: (1) the investor
actually meets the criteria specified in Rule 501(a), or (2) the issuer has a
"reasonable belief' that the investor meets the criteria specified in Rule
501(a).45 The issuing release stated that the "reasonable steps" verification
requirement "is separate from and independent of the requirement that sales
be limited to accredited investors, and must be satisfied even if all
purchasers happen to be accredited investors."4 6
The SEC believed this separate requirement would "avoid diminishing
the incentive for issuers to undertake the reasonable verification steps
envisioned by the [JOBS Act]." 47 Businesses can lose the exemption even
if all purchasers are accredited investors. They actually have to do the
work to verify accredited investor status if they want to advertise.
Requiring crowdfunded businesses to pass two separate tests opens the
door for purchasers who actually are accredited investors to sue businesses
for not taking reasonable steps to verify their status if they lose money by
41. SEC Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).
42. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release
No. 69,959, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 10, 2013).
43. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
44. SEC Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2015).
45. 17. C.F.R. § 230.506.
46. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release
No. 69,959, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 10, 2013).
47. Id.
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investing in that business. If these accredited investors sue businesses for
failing to verify their status, disclosed information to the investors will not
even be an issue if they advertised but failed to satisfy Rule 506(c)'s
verification standards. Of course, if the person actually is not an accredited
investor, their case is even stronger.
This may change existing law-at least for Rule 506 (c) offerings.
Courts have frequently dismissed law suits in which investors claimed they
were not accredited investors, because courts have ruled the investors
should not benefit from misleading the seller by signing false statements,
unless investors can show the seller knew the statements were false.
iii. Advantages ofRule 506(c) Comparedto Rule 506(b)
Rule 506(b) offerings have been using technology platforms for
almost two decades. So, what advantages does Rule 506(c) offer? Why is
it worth the trouble to verify accredited investor status? There are several
advantages Rule 506(c) offerings have over Rule 506(b) offerings that are
conducted on technology platforms that limit access to offering information
to prequalified accredited investors. First, companies can use social media
and other advertising to attract investors to their offering. This means
businesses can be more proactive in attracting investors. Companies do not
have to passively wait for investors to find their offering on a platform.
Second, crowdfunded businesses can use non-accredited investors to tell
accredited investors about their offering. This allows businesses to try to
create "buzz" about their offering and have it "go viral" within certain
internet and social media communities that share common interests so that
non-accredited investors can become part of their sales distribution
network.
B.

Title III Exemptions

Title III of the JOBS Act has yet to yield any approved SEC
Regulations. Title III, or the "Capital Raising Online While Deterring
Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012" (CROWDFUND Act),48
is the most progressive title of the JOBS Act, and proposes adding a
crowdfunding exemption under the 1933 Act. 49 This exemption allows for
an offering which does not exceed $1 million in a twelve-month period.so
It also places a cap on the aggregate amount sold to any individual
unaccredited investor by the issuer, which must not exceed:
48. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 301, 126 Stat.
306, 315 (2012).
49. Id. § 302, 126 Stat. at 315 (2012) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012)).
50. Id. § 302(a), 126 Stat. at 315.
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(i) the greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of the annual income or net worth of
such investor, as applicable, if either the annual income or the net worth of
the investor is less than $100,000; and
(ii) 10 percent of the annual income or net worth of such investor, as
applicable, not to exceed a maximum aggregate amount sold of $100,000,
if either the annual income or net worth of the investor is equal to or more
than $100,000.51
Likewise, the transaction must be conducted through a broker or a funding
portal complying with the requirements of the Securities Act. 52 These
portals are what have largely stalled the implementation of Title III. 3
However some portals, such as CraftFund, have already begun to provide
information seeming to foreshadow future interstate offerings. 54

51. Id.
5 2. Id.
53. John Lion, JOBS Act Title III and Crowdfunding: What We Know So Far, ONEVEST
BLOG (Mar. 19, 2015), http://blog.onevest.com/blog/2015/3/19/jobs-act-title-iii-and-crowd
funding-what-we-know-so-far [https://perma.cc/L4LQ-22Z8].
54. All Companies on CraftFund, CRAFTFUND, https://craftfund.com/company/all
[https://perma.ce/H3PU-NZB4] (last visited May 9, 2016). CraftFund, as of Apr. 2, 2016,
although not offering securities to buyers or from companies outside of Wisconsin, had
companies (primarily within the craft brewing industry) listed from its home state of
Wisconsin, but also from North Carolina, Colorado, Florida, New York, Michigan,
Maryland, Utah, California, Arizona, Wyoming, Georgia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Tennessee, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Alabama, Texas, Illinois, Virginia, and Hawaii. Id.
The site allows anyone to create a user profile and browse and follow the companies listed
on their site. How it Works: The Process, CRAFTFUND, http://about.craftfund.com
[https://perma.cc/BJ9U-L295] (last visited May 9, 2016). However, only Wisconsin
residents can create a user profile allowing them to browse offerings among other things.
Id. It also limits issuers to being within the Wisconsin food/beverage and real estate
development industries, and issuers must apply, complete a background check, file notice,
disclosure documents, and escrow agreements with the Wisconsin Department of Financial
Institutions. Id, Once the issuer is accepted by CraftFund, he can list on the site, solicit
investments, sell to Wisconsin residents, and receive his capital via escrow when he has
accomplished his capital-raising goals. But see All Companies on CrowdFund, supra note
54 ("CraftFund is not an investment adviser and makes no recommendation as to investment
in any securities. Nothing contained on this website constitutes an offer of securities to any
person who is not a legal resident of the State of Wisconsin, and no sales of securities will
be made to persons who are not legal residents of State of Wisconsin. Neither the Securities
and Exchange Commission nor any state regulator has passed upon the merits of or given its
approval to the securities, the terms of the offerings, or the accuracy or completeness of any
offering materials."). See also F.A.Q., CRAFTFUND, http://about.craftfund.com [https://
perma.cc/2HQ3-5A4B] (last visited May 9, 2016).
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C. Title IV-MandatedRegulation A+ Exemptions
Title IV of the JOBS Act directed the SEC to issue a new version of
Regulation A permitting higher offering limits and other provisions that
make the new Regulation A more attractive to issuers. The new Regulation
A has been nicknamed Regulation A+.
Regulation A+ 55 is the most radical update of the JOBS Act yet
implemented, with its final rules having gone into effect as of June 20,
2015.56 What was implemented was not crowdfunding per se, in the same
vein as Title III, and its regulatory mechanism is significantly different.1 7 It
more resembles a traditional securities offering, as it is the direct
descendant of the former Regulation A.ss However, Regulation A+, being
"offspring," is still a "next-generation" offering.59
II. THE REGULATION A+ REVOLUTION
Regulation A+ allows businesses to achieve three primary objectives.
First, they can raise capital. Second, shareholders and affiliates of the
issuer can resell their shares in the offering. And finally, the issuer can
develop a resale market for shareholders and new investors to gain liquidity
after the offering. Liquidity-or the lack thereof-often affects the price
investors are willing to pay in many offerings. Therefore, these three goals
are intertwined. Liquidity and resale markets usually are important to a
business's ability to raise capital at reasonable valuations.
A.

The Two Tiers of Regulation A+

The update to Regulation A allows for two tiers of Regulation A+
offerings: (1) Tier I offerings allow for the raising of up to $20 million in a
twelve-month period; (2) Tier II offerings allow for the raising of up to $50

55. SEC Rules 251-263, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (2015).
56. Id
57. Anna Pinedo, It's Not Crowdfunding!, MOFOJUMPSTARTER BLOG (July 13, 2015),
[https://perma.cc/S5B
http://www.mofojumpstarter.com/2015/07/13/its-not-crowdfunding/
Q-ZLE6].
58. Thomas J. Kim, Regulation A+ Takes Effect, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 20, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/20/
regulation-a-takes-effect/ [https://perma.cc/6MER-RFSC].
59. See id. Regulation A+ has fewer disclosure compliance prescriptions than
registered securities, permits short-form registration to immediately list equity securities on
a national exchange, benefits from Blue Sky Law preemption, and results in an offering that
takes advantage of the marketing benefits of a registered securities offering, but with the
lower compliance cost that comes with a securities offering. See id.
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million in a twelve-month period.60 The two tiers are both subject to the
same basic disclosure requirements of providing: issuer information; issuer
eligibility; bad actor certification; summary information; jurisdictions;
unregistered offerings; a cover page; a table of contents; risk factors;
dilution; plan of distribution; use of proceeds; business; property;
management's discussion and analysis (MD&A); directors, executive
officers, and significant employees; security ownership; securities being
offered; bad actor disclosure; EDGAR document incorporation; exhibits;
61
and signatures. 61 Both tiers utilize SEC Form 1-A.
B. Tier II Requirements
Tier II issuers are subjected to more stringent requirements than a Tier
I offering, yet have a higher offering limit of $50 million in securities sales
within a twelve month period.63 After the initial twelve month period,
issuer affiliates may re-sell up to $15 million in a twelve-month period.64
A noted difference is in financial statement disclosure: Tier I may provide
unaudited balance sheets and financial statements, whereas Tier II must
provide audited balance sheets and financial statements.s The cost of these
audits can be remarkably prohibitive for start-up businesses, which
oftentimes are seeking early-stage investment for the same reason they
cannot afford such audits: they need money.66 Tier I issuers are also
permitted to provide less information as to executive compensation and
67
related party transactions. Most pertinently for Regulation A+ offerings,
the liability provisions of section 11 of the 1933 Act68 for material

60. SEC Rule 251, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2015).
61. Kim, supra note 58.
62. Form 1-A, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/about/
forms/forml-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A2T-32JU] (last visited May 9, 2016).
63. SEC Rule 251, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2015).
64. Id.
65. Kim, supra note 58.
66. In Securities Act Release No. 9741 that issued Regulation A+, the SEC estimates
the cost for audited financial statements for Regulation A+ offerings are likely to average in
excess of $28,000. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions under the
Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, Exchange Act Release No.
74,578, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806 (Mar. 25, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 232,
239, 240, 249, and 260). The SEC qualifies this estimate by saying that audits should be
easier and less expensive for small businesses, because auditing a small business is less
complicated than it is for bigger companies. See id.
67. Kim, supra note 58.
68. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 11, 48 Stat. 74, 82 (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012)).
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misstatements or omissions do not apply. 6 9 This standard for registered
securities offerings imposes strict liability on the issuer, and liability for
executive officers, directors, and the auditing accountant (subject to a due
diligence defense).
However, section 3(b)(2)(D) of the 1933 Act70 still imposes seller
liability under section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act7 ' for Regulation A+
sellers. This opens up Regulation A+ issuers to greater potential liability
than Rule 506 issuers.
C Tier I Requirements
Under Regulation A+, Tier I offerings are subjected to fewer
requirements, as the offering limit is lower. For Tier I offerings, issuers are
limited to offering no more than $15 million in securities sales within a
twelve-month period. After expiration of the initial twelve month period,
issuer affiliates are limited to reselling no more than $6 million over a
twelve-month period. It is important to note that, unlike Tier II, Tier I does
not preempt state registration laws for either offers or sales of securities. 72
State anti-fraud rules, however, apply to both Tier I and Tier II offerings.
Finally, one of the primary things issuers should consider when choosing
whether to make a Tier I offering or a Tier II offering is how state
securities registration laws will affect their Tier I offering with respect to
expenses, timing, and substantive terms of the offering.

69. Id.
70. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401, 126 Stat.
306, 323-25 (2012) (amending section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2012))).
71. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 105, 109
Stat. 737, 757 (amending section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 771(2012))).
72. The JOBS Act added section 18(b)(4)(D) to the Securities Act, exempting section
3(b)(2) securities from state Blue Sky Laws if the securities are "(i) offered or sold on a
national securities exchange; or (ii) offered or sold to a qualified purchaser, as defined by
the Commission ..... Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. 112-106,
§ 401, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D)). The new rule defines
"qualified purchaser" as "any person to whom securities are offered or sold pursuant to a
Tier 2 offering of this Regulation A." Amendments, 80 Fed. Reg. at 21899 (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 230.256). Since Tier I offerings are not included in "qualified purchasers," they
are not preempted by Blue Sky Laws. Id.
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III. DISCLOSURE MATERIALITY STANDARDS IN THE NEW COMPLIANCE
LANDSCAPE

"What is 'material'?" is the most compelling question a securities
lawyer needs to answer with regards to tailoring disclosures to comply with
the SEC and avoiding being relegated to the regulatory doghouse. This
question is the difference between successfully generating capital
investment and committing fraud.7 3 The materiality standard generally for
securities offerings has not changed under the JOBS Act and is still found
in SEC Rule 405:
The term material, when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of
information as to any subject, limits the information required to those
matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security
registered. 74
This standard is focused on the information provided, and how a reasonable
investor would prioritize that information in a given context. Implicit in
the standard, explicit in practice, and clearly evidenced by case law, the
question of "what is material?" takes different forms when being disclosed
by an issuer in different contexts and is analyzed on an ad hoc basis.
"[T]here must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." 76 The
same standard for material affirmative representations is applied to

73. The entire purpose of the 1933 Act, and other laws of the post-1929 Stock Market
Crash era was to protect consumers and place stricter fraud standards on businesses seeking
to sell securities. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, 74 (preamble)
("An Act to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate
and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale
thereof...."); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 2, 48 Stat. 881,
881-82 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012)) ("[T]ransactions in securities as
commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected
with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and
control of such transactions ... including . . to insure the maintenance of fair and honest
markets in such transactions."); see also STAFF OF H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN
COM., 95th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 556-60 (Comm. Print No.
95-29, 1977) (discussing disclosure philosophy behind federal securities legislation).
74. SEC Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2015).
75. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988) (discussing within a merger
context that "[m]ateriality depends on the facts and thus is to be determined on a
case-by-case basis").
76. Id. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976)).
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omissions, even though omissions are perhaps more latent and
unintentional.n Materiality is "a mixed question of law and fact, involving
as it does the application of a legal standard to a particular set of facts." 78
This Comment now explores how this standard mutates when applied to
three common contexts: (1) financial statements; (2) projections; and (3)
due diligence.
A. FinancialStatement Materiality

Financial statements are legally important, but very expensive. The
costs of an accountant include the professional service hours spent auditing
financial statements. If such information will be used in a securities
offering, however, the accountant will also include an upcharge for
assuming the additional professional liability. Thus, small businesses often
adapt the way they operate in order to maximize cost savings while
minimizing their liabilities by tying the quantity of information they
disclose to the size and complexity of their business. This takes the form of
many small to mid-sized businesses using cash financial statements for tax
purposes rather than accrual-based Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) compliant statements. Under the new regulations there
are new requirements regarding financial statements.
Yet, materiality has not changed. It is still perhaps the best disclosure
approach to adhere to the traditional adage, "If you have nothing nice to
say, don't say anything at all." 79 It is still a material misrepresentation for a
chief executive officer to significantly overstate a company's earnings.80 It
is still reasonable for a jury to regard concealing information by stock
options backdating as material. 8 Each case is still analyzed on its own
facts, and the Court has consistently rejected the application of bright-lined
materiality analysis, opting for a fact-driven analysis reflecting the
diversity of American businesses.82 The SEC dealt specifically with
77. TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449 (applying Rule 405 materiality standard to
omission of fact).
78. Id. at 450.
79. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding in an action for
securities fraud under Rule 10b that "[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak[J" and further holding "that a
duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market
information").
80. Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2003).
81. SEC v. Reyes, 491 F. Supp. 2d 906, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
82. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1998) (rejecting a bright-line
rule for materiality); accord Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 40 (2011)
("As in Basic, Matrixx's categorical rule would 'artificially exclud[e]' information that
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materiality issues in financial statements in Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
99 (SAB 99)83 issued August 12, 1999. Saying the SEC has addressed the
issue does not mean the SEC itself even agrees with or is fond of how
85
muddied the standard is.84 Still, some courts are fond of the standard.
The same plaintiff-friendly statute of limitations is in place.
Plaintiffs in suits under securities laws generally have "two years after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation,"87 or five years after the
violation, whichever is earlier.8 8 A defendant can be made liable at any
time within a five-year period for a misrepresentation, if an individual
plaintiff did not discover the facts constituting fraud until much later.
However, the date of the violation, as used in title 28, section 1658(b) of
the United States Code, has been held to mean the date of the fraud or
misconduct itself, which means the section "'serves as an unyielding and
absolute barrier' to a cause of action, regardless of whether that cause has
accrued." 8 9
Additionally, in a securities fraud claim, in order to be material a
representation or omission must be "in connection with the purchase or sale

'would otherwise be considered significant to the trading decision of a reasonable
investor."' (quoting Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 236)).
83. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19,
1999) ("The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in light
of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is probable that the
judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report would have been changed or
influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.").
84. See Paul S. Atkins, SEC Comm'r, Address at the Twentieth Annual Tulane
Corporate Law Institute (Apr. 3, 2008) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2008/spch040308psa.htm [https://perma.cc/AN4H-JEVN]) ("Anyone who has
tried to apply SAB 99 is left with little certainty.").
85. See Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2000) ("SAB No. 99
is thoroughly reasoned and consistent with existing law .... .").

86. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2012). Section 1658(b) provides:
[A] private right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or
contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities

laws ... may be brought not later than the earlier of-(1) 2 years after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) 5 years after such violation.
Id.
87. Id. This has been held to mean that the statute of limitation begins to run: (1) when
the plaintiff did in fact discover; or (2) when a hypothetical objectively reasonably diligent
plaintiff would have discovered the "facts constituting the violation," whichever comes first,
and that the "facts constituting the violation" include a scienter requirement of intent to

deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 653 (2010).
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).
89. McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Klein v.
DePuy, Inc., 506 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2007)).
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of any security." 90 This means that in order to have standing to sue for
money damages under Rule 1Ob-5, 91 the plaintiff must be the actual
purchaser or seller of the securities in question.92 It is not sufficiently
justiciable for the following groups of individuals (who may have been
directly affected by a representation or omission) to bring claims under
Rule lOb-5: (1) potential purchasers of securities who allege they were
fraudulently induced not to buy; (2) actual shareholders who allege they
were fraudulently induced not to sell; and (3) shareholders who sustained a
loss in the value of their investment as the result of fraudulent activity.93
The standard for injunctive relief, however, is easier for the plaintiff to
satisfy, although involves more narrow factual circumstances to allege a
sufficient injury-in-fact. 9 4
The justiciability standards help to limit
peripheral liability for disclosures, and favors issuers who pre-screen sales
and sell to accredited investors or who employ some "sophistication"
requirement to their investors, because they are only liable to their
investors, and only liable to their investors regarding facts or omissions
which caused the investors to make buying or selling decisions." In the
absence of both requirements, there is no suit. However, there is a "fraud
on the market" exception to the "in connection with" requirement, which
raises a presumption that the market price of a security was influenced by a
representation, and affected sale or purchase of securities. 96 It is unclear

90. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
9 1. Id.
92. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737-39 (1975).
93. Id.
94. Multiple courts exercise a relaxed standard in this regard. See United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981); Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th Cir.
1976).
95. The "in connection with" requirement has been held to be satisfied when
misconduct "touches" or "coincides" with a particular securities transaction, and such a
determination is made using a factor analysis:
(1) whether a securities sale was necessary to the completion of the fraudulent
scheme . .. ; (2) whether the parties' relationship was such that it would
necessarily involve trading in securities ... ; (3) whether the defendant intended
to induce a securities transaction . .. ; and (4) whether material misrepresentations
were disseminated to the public in a medium upon which a reasonable investor
would rely.
SEC v. Pirate Inv'r LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Such factors are not dispositive or mandatory requirements, but have been
used to guide analysis. See id.
96. In order for the presumption to apply plaintiff must prove the following: "(1) that
the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known, (2) that they were material, (3) that the
stock traded in an efficient market, and (4) that the plaintiff traded the stock between the
time the misrepresentations were made and when the truth was revealed." Halliburton Co.
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whether such an exception would or could be invoked in an initial offering
of securities, however, seeing as there is not an ongoing "efficient market"
for such securities. 97 Taken together, knowledge of these standards makes
"general solicitation" disclosures less scary, because issuers can employ the
same factor analyses as their home courts to tailor their individual
disclosures to investors. They even have an advantage the court does not:
they have intimate knowledge of the intricacies and idiosyncrasies of their
own company, industry, and investors. Combining intimate knowledge of
their business with knowledge of the controlling securities fraud standard9 8
potential plaintiffs must meet is useful for businesses to consider in
tailoring their disclosures. Individual issuers should also keep in mind the
"with particularity" pleading standard for plaintiffs. 99
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014) (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 248 n.7 (1988) and Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804
(2011)).
97. "Efficient market" factors include: (1) whether the stock trades at a high weekly
volume; (2) whether the stock is followed and reported on by securities analysts;
(3) whether the stock has market makers and arbitrageurs; (4) whether the company is

eligible to file SEC registration Form S-3-used by companies whose stock is actively
traded and widely followed-as opposed to Form S-I or S-2; (5) whether there are
"empirical facts showing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate
events or financial releases and an immediate response in the stock price." Binder v.

Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp.
1264, 1287 (D.N.J. 1989)).
98. A private plaintiff must establish: "(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by
the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and
the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission;

(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation." Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Sci-Atlanta, Inc., 552
U.S. 148, 157 (2008). Lower courts have required the plaintiff to provide evidence of all six
elements, ruling that a claim will fail if it is missing one element. See Paracor Fin., Inc. v.

Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 1996) (compressing the six
Stoneridge elements into four).

99. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) established
heightened pleading standards in securities cases where the plaintiff alleges false or
misleading statements or omissions of material fact. The PSLRA provides:

In any private action arising under this chapter in which plaintiff alleges that the
defendant(A) made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
(B) omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances in which they were made, not
misleading;

the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading,
the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation
regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the
complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is

formed.
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The purpose of financial statements is to provide some sort of
investment trajectory-the SEC knows this, which is why brokers
frequently disclaim "past performance is no guarantee of future
performance" or some variation thereof. Small businesses with few assets
and little history of past performance do not have the same danger of
providing relied-upon representations as large businesses with a long
operating history, and such statements may not be all too material to a
reasonable investor's decision, because the more important factors would
include what intangible assets the company has that adds to its valuation.
Likewise, a company possessing a less than impressive balance sheet may
indeed have valuable interests such as intellectual property, valuable and
beneficial relationships with potential customers, or a good idea yet poor
marketing due to lack of capital. Choosing not to provide investors with
GAAP compliant financial statements on the basis they are immaterial
always involves some level of risk. In many situations, the risk level is too
high. But in some situations, such as a beginner business with little assets
or cash flow, risk levels are lower and the cost to the issuer is so prohibitive
it may make sense to evaluate the materiality of financial statements and
tailor disclosures to investors to make financial statements not material.
i. Regulation D Offerings

Rule 502(b)(2)(i) of Regulation D recognizes disclosure rules are not a
one-size-fits-all matter when it provides a materiality qualifier to the
specific financial statements requirements applying to issuers who sell to
non-accredited investors in Rule 505 and Rule 506(b) offerings: "[A]t a
reasonable time prior to the sale of securities the issuer shall furnish to the
purchaser the following information, to the extent material to an
understanding of the issuer, its business and the securities being offered:
[the financial statement information provided in paragraph (B) and the
other information provided in paragraph (A)]."oo

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101,
§ 21D, 109 Stat. 737, 747 (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291,
48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012))) (emphasis added); see also Vess
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[A] plaintiff must set
forth more than the neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. The plaintiff must set
forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.") (citing Decker v.
GlenFed, Inc. (In re GlenFed, Inc.), 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994))); Norfolk Cty. Ret.
Sys. v. Ustian, No. 07-CV-07014, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65731 at *2425 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(applying PSLRA standard to "excruciatingly detailed" complaint and grouping allegations
into four general categories: (1) red flags; (2) misstatements; (3) the magnitude and
pervasiveness of the accounting errors; and (4) motive and opportunity).
100. SEC Rule 502, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i) (2015).
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By tying the financial statement disclosure standard to the financial
knowledge a business possesses about itself, Regulation D allows for
greater flexibility in making such disclosures in alternative more informal
media. If a company chooses to use non-GAAP compliant means to
disclose their financial information, a good approach is to follow the format
of a Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of a
Prospectus and the periodic reports (Form 10-K and 10-Q) which public
companies file with the SEC. '0'
In Regulation D offerings, issuers that decide their financial
statements are not material to understanding the issuer, its business, or the
offering take the risk courts will disagree with the issuer's determination.
Placement agents, attorneys, and other professional advisers may also
disagree with the issuer's determination.
Most securities offering
documents contain many immaterial facts, which are often included out of
fear someone may later decide they are material. Dumping a lot of
immaterial information into a Private Placement Memorandum usually is
less costly than doing a fine analysis to weed out immaterial information.
Thus, both risk protection and lower traction costs are usually aligned.
However, this risk and cost alignment often breaks apart when it comes to
financial statements. Given the expense and delay involved in producing
financial statements, some issuers would incur substantially lower
transaction costs if they did not have to produce GAAP compliant financial
statements.
ii. Regulation A+ Offerings

Regulation A+ and Title III Federal Crowdfunding rules and
registered offerings do not specifically give issuers the same flexibility
regarding materiality Regulation D offers. In these types of offerings, the
101. The SEC describes the purpose of MD&A as follows:
The purpose of MD&A is not complicated. It is to provide readers information
"necessary to an understanding of [a company's] financial condition, changes in
financial condition and results of operations." The MD&A requirements are
intended to satisfy three principal objectives: [(1)] To provide a narrative
explanation of a company's financial statements that enables investors to see the
company through the eyes of management; [(2)] To enhance the overall financial
disclosure and provide the context within which financial information should be
analyzed; and [(3)] To provide information about the quality of, and potential
variability of, a company's earnings and cash flow, so that investors can ascertain
the likelihood that past performance is indicative of future performance.
Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange Act
Release No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75056, 75056 (Dec. 29, 2003) (first alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted).
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issuer could lose its exemption if it does not comply with the conditions
stated in the exemption. 102 For public offerings filed with the SEC
requiring SEC staff approval, the staff has been reluctant to waive financial
statement requirement, even in situations where the issuer has acquired a
"significant" business for which the financial records cannot be audited. 103
This issue sometimes arises when the issuer buys part of a business and the
seller did not maintain financial records, which makes it impossible to
distinguish the financial performance of both parts of the business, or to
determine when financial records are missing.
The SEC generally takes the position that if the acquired business is
"significant" (as defined in Rule 3-05 of Regulation S-X), the issuer must
delay registration until the issuer can provide audited financial statements
including the acquired business. 10 4 If two years of financial statements are
required, this could mean operating the business for two years after the
acquisition before one can produce the required financial statements. 105
Given this substantial burden on issuers acquiring other businesses, issuers
should not assume the SEC is likely to grant financial statement waivers in
Regulation A+ offerings based on arguments financial statements are not
material.
B. ProjectionsMateriality
A common disclosure minefield is providing forward looking opinions
and presenting them as though they were fact. This used to be the norm in
the era before federal regulation of securities.106 Oftentimes, projections
102. See generally SEC Rules 251-263, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2015) (Regulation
A+ requirements); Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat. 306 (2012) (Title III Crowdfunding requirements). For a further discussion of Title III
crowdfunding requirements, see supra note 6.
103. Form 1-A requires the Regulation A+ issuer to provide the following information
with regards to financial statements: cash and cash equivalents; investment securities;
accounts and notes receivable; property, plant, and equipment; total assets; accounts payable
and accrued liabilities; long term debt; total liabilities; total stockholders' equity; total
liabilities and equity; total revenues; costs and expenses applicable to revenues; depreciation
and amortization; net income; earnings per share-basic; and earnings per share-diluted.
Form 1-A, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/
forml-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A2T-32J-U] (last visited May 9, 2016).
104. SEC Rule 210, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-05 (2015).
105. Id.
106. Years before the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the U.S. Supreme Court
commented:
The name that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed, that is, to
use the language of a cited case, "speculative schemes which have no more basis
than so many feet of 'blue sky'; or, as stated by counsel in another case, "to stop
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are useful to provide investors with an idea of how a company views itself.
But there are many potential issues in providing projections. When a
projection is made, it is made utilizing the existing universe of the facts; yet
in the future, the facts may change, and the projections may need to be
updated to reflect changes in the facts. Inevitably, these projections must
rest themselves on assumptions about past performance and/or future
trends.
Five factors can be used to help an issuer assess its liability exposure
with regards to projections: (1) risk and "forward looking statements";
(2) process and standards; (3) good faith; (4) reasonable assumptions; and
(5) disclosure of assumptions.
i. Risk and "ForwardLooking Statements"
Another statutory implement which issuers would be wise to utilize is
the "safe harbor" provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
This provides an exemption for material
of 1995 ("PSLRA").10 7
projections which are identified as forward looking statements 0 8 and
accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements. 1 09 The safe harbor also
exempts immaterial "forward-looking statements," 0 but the fact
dependent and mutable standard for materiality provides less clear
guidance to rely upon, as noted supra.
A smart practice for issuers would be to issue disclaimers in all
circumstances making absolutely clear to potential investors the amount of
risk they are entering into, the contingencies possible if the company's
assumptions and projections differ from actual future performance, and that
a contingency exists (however likely or unlikely) that the investor could
lose their whole investment.
the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines
and other like fraudulent exploitations." Even if the descriptions be regarded as
rhetorical, the existence of evil is indicated, and a belief of its detriment; and we
shall not pause to do more than state that the prevention of deception is within the
competency of government and that the appreciation of the consequences of it is
not open for our review.
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550-51 (1917) (citations omitted).
107. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
§ 102, § 21E, 109 Stat. 737, 753 (1995) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (2012))).
108. A "forward-looking statement" is defined as "a statement containing a projection of
revenues, income (including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share,
capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items . . . ." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-5(i)(1) (2012).
109. Id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i).
110. Id. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(ii).
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ii. Process and Standards

In creating its projections, the issuer will likely rely on professional
standards such as those provided by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA),"' the SEC,'1 2 or others. Informing investors
which standards were used in making disclosures makes it easier for the
investor or potential investor to decide whether they should rely upon the
projections, and provides cover for the issuer in the case of a regulatory
audit. If professional standards are not used in projections, the issuer
should tell investors and disclose the alternative processes and standards
used to produce the projections.
iii. Good Faith
Adhering to the duty to provide good faith projections not only helps
to provide a good argument in the case of a fraud lawsuit, it also helps to
drive investment and create investor confidence in the issuer. 1' If a
company has a history of good faith dealing, the investors may develop a
better relationship with the company, as nobody could be accused of
"hiding the ball.""14
iv. Reasonable Assumptions
The reasonableness of projections took on a new importance in light
of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers
District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund."1 The case dealt
with the stock issuer's belief that its contracts with pharmaceutical
manufacturers were "legally and economically valid" and its representation
to that effect to investors.116 In assessing this opinion statement, the Court
partially softened the standard for untrue statements of material facts,
111.

See generally AT Section 301: FinancialForecasts and Projections, AM. INST. OF

PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,
http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/
DownloadableDocuments/AT-00301.pdf [http://perma.cc/2MSD-KPHC] (last visited May
9,2016).

CERTIFIED

112. See, Div. OF CORP. FIN., U.S.

SEC. & ExCH COMM'N,

FINANCIAL REPORTING

MANUAL 197-98 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffinancialreportingmanual.
pdf#topic3 [https://perma.cc/YRD3-PQRR].
113. See U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 2014) ("Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code]
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.").
114. "Good faith" is defined in the Uniform Commercial Code as: "honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." Id. § 1-201(20).
115. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct.
1318 (2015).
116. Id. at 1323.
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holding that an opinion can only be an untrue statement of material fact if it
was not subjectively and sincerely held at the time it was relayed to
investors.' 17 The Court also held that opinions can still be materially false
and misleading if the underlying material facts about the opinion-making
inquiry or the underlying knowledge are not provided, and that the omitted
facts would cause a reasonable investor to come to a conflicting opinion." 8
In short, under the Omnicare standard, an issuer is more likely to be found
guilty of omitting material facts that tend to undermine the reasonableness
of its issued projection opinion than being found guilty of providing a
facially materially false and misleading projection.1 9 This is because an
issuer has the defense of subjectively believing the truth of its opinion at
the time, and to avoid this sort of liability, the issuer must only provide
opinions to investors that the issuer itself believes to be true.1 20 Omnicare
reemphasizes the need for issuers to provide the full factual context
underlying its assumptions, to avoid giving false and misleading opinions.
v. DisclosureofAssumptions
Applying the Omnicare decision, the issuer can avoid liability for the
omission of material facts underlying projections by carrying on its
projection-generating process with transparency. Such transparency need
not be in real time, but should be contemporaneous with the release of a
projection.121 The credence behind this line of thought is that if an issuer
provides the entire universe of material facts to its investors, even if it
forms an unreasonable opinion, the disclosure of the facts serves to caution
the investors. This then mitigates the unreasonableness of the issuer
projection, so that the investors can come to their own opinions, as well as
their own opinions about the issuer's opinions. "[T]o avoid exposure for
omissions. . . an issuer need only divulge an opinion's basis, or else make
clear the real tentativeness of its belief. Such ways of conveying opinions
so that they do not mislead will keep valuable information
flowing[,] ... the only kind of information investors need." 2 2
For new businesses seeking to take advantage of the new JOBS Act
registration exemptions, providing projections could be its strongest ally.
Issuers have a duty to do everything in their power to test the projection
assumptions, so that in a suit for fraud, the company can rest upon a history

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 1327.
Id. at 1329.
See id.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1329-30.
Id. at 1332.
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of reasonableness with regards to making its projections. Only the most
updated and accurate information should be provided, which of course adds
to the compliance cost. Such projection should also comply with the
overall duty of good faith. 12 3 But for businesses with little operating
history or cash on hand, objectively evidenced optimism in projections is
what drives investment. For any size and complexity of issuer, the issuer
should provide its projections, assumptions, and disclaimers, along with the
standards and processes that it used to produce its projections.
C. Due Diligence Materiality
Due diligence is the baseline factual investigation that parties do to
ensure that their transactions are based in reality.1 24 The above analysis for
fraud standards and materiality also assists conductors of due diligence.
The type and scope of due diligence performed prior to a transaction is
often shaped by the exposure to potential liability. There are generally
three sources of liability in securities law: (1) section 11 of the 1933 Act1 2 5
for misstatements and misleading omissions in a registration statement;
(2) section 12(a) of the 1933 Act1 2 6 for misstatements and misleading
omissions in public offerings (including exempt public offerings),1 2 7
whether or not in a registration statement; (3) section 10128 and Rule
lob-51 29 liability for misstatements and misleading omissions in private
offerings. Section 10 and Rule 10b-5 liabilities are most pertinent to the
private securities offerings altered under the JOBS Act, however the proper

123. Providing specifically tailored cautionary language as to each projection is the best
practice in satisfying of the duty of good faith. See Noam Noked, Giving Good Guidance:
What Every Public Company Should Know, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (Nov. 8, 2012), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/11/08/giving-good-guidancewhat-every-public-company-should-know/ [https://perma.cc/KF47-VGGX].
124. A more traditional legal source has defined the term as "[a] prospective buyer's or
broker's investigation and analysis of a target company, a piece of property, or a newly
issued security[.] A failure to exercise due diligence may sometimes result in liability, as
when a broker recommends a security without first investigating it adequately." Due
Diligence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
125. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 11, 48 Stat. 74, 82 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012)).
126. Section 12(a) was added by amendment to the Securities Act of 1933 in 1995.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 105, 109
Stat. 737, 757 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2012)).
127. This includes offerings utilizing Regulation A+, Title III, and state-law intrastate
crowdfunding exemptions, but not Rule 506 offerings.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2012).
129. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). This is the only source of liability
for Rule 506 offerings, which will be discussed further, infra.
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scope and extent of due diligence, like materiality, is a mixed question of
fact and law, and is case specific. However, like materiality, there are
principles and strategies that parties can employ in conducting due
diligence of transactions.
In cases under Rule lOb-5, there is more limited liability for
corporations for failure to conduct due diligence. The Supreme Court
addressed this issue in Central Bank, N.A. v. FirstInterstate Bank, N.A.1 3 0
It held that there was no secondary liability under Rule lOb-5 for those who
had aided and abetted a violator of the Rule. 13 1 The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was passed and later gave the SEC the
power to enjoin lawyers and others who knowingly aid and abet a primary
violation, but this statute did not create a private right of action by investors
against lawyers and other professionals, thereby leaving the Central Bank
decision largely in effect.1 3 2
IV. THE TROUBLED INTERSECTION OF DISCLOSURE AND THE NEW MEDIA

With the current state of crowdfunding regulations, one would be right
to be thoroughly confused, frightened, and befuddled. So are many of the
small businesses that were initially the intended beneficiaries of the JOBS
Act. The questions many small business owners worry themselves with are
ones concerned with the bottom line: liability exposure. There are several
considerations these small businesses must take into account.
Social media is an important tool that issuers can take advantage of if
they are willing to bear the risks. Social media is the great unknown in the
new compliance landscape. There is little guidance for private issuers
under registration exemptions in this regard, but such issuers would be wise
to conform their practices to those of registered issuers whenever
possible.1 3 3 The trend in the securities field is against selective disclosure
of information in favor of more public disclosures.' 34 The SEC has issued
130. Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
131. Id. at 191.
132. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (1995); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Sci-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
162 (2008) ("Aiding and abetting liability is authorized in actions brought by the SEC but
not by private parties.").
133. See generally Securities Act Rules: Questions and Answers of General
Applicability, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/

guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm [http://perma.cc/2M3Z 36GP] (last updated Aug. 6,
2015).
134. The SEC discussed this trend when releasing new Final Rules in 2000:
[W]e have become increasingly concerned about the selective disclosure of

material information by issuers. As reflected in recent publicized reports, many
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guidance about the use of social media with regards to public companies. 13 5
These guidelines are an extension from its guidance governing disclosure
of information via company webpages.1 36 Its overall attitude toward the
use of social media is an optimistic one, but still one that emphasizes
issuers notifying investors of disclosure practices. 13 7
In applying the same natural extension of the analysis that the SEC
uses to craft its decision making, what conclusions can be drawn for issuers
under the JOBS Act? Looking at prior points the SEC emphasized in its
disclosure guidance in the realm of internet media, the SEC puts an
emphasis on the distinguishing between "push" and "pull" technology. 138
These two "static" technologies are distinguished from the more
"dynamic," "interactive" technologies. 139 Utilizing such technologies
allows an issuer to control the access and release of information. This
distinction, as released in 2008 guidance, is a bit dated, but still has great

issuers are disclosing important nonpublic information, such as advance warnings
of earnings results, to securities analysts or selected institutional investors or both,
before making full disclosure of the same information to the general public.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716
(Aug. 24, 2000).
135. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Exchange Act Release No. 69,279 (Apr. 2,
2013), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-69279.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2EJWBPR] [hereinafter Investigative Report] (determining that use of a Netflix executive's
Facebook page to disclose that Netflix had streamed 1 billion hours of content in the month
of June was not actionable under Regulation FD (17 C.F.R. § § 243.100-.103) and section
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
136. Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, 73 Fed. Reg. 45862
(Aug. 7, 2008).
137. The Investigative Report states:
We appreciate the value and prevalence of social media channels in contemporary
market communications, and the Commission supports companies seeking new
ways to communicate and engage with shareholders and the market.... [I]ssuers
must take steps sufficient to alert investors and the market to the channels it will
use for the dissemination of material, nonpublic information.
Investigative Report, supra note 135, at 8.
138. See Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange Act
Release No. 58,288, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,351, 73 Fed. Reg. 45862,
45867 n.51 (Aug. 7, 2008) ("Push technology, or server push, describes a type of
Internet-based communication where the request for the transmission of information
originates with the publisher or central server. It is contrasted with pull technology, where
the request for the transmission of information originates with the receiver or client.").
139. Id. at 45864 & n.20 ("'Interactive' investor-related tools and functionality, such as
'blogs' and electronic shareholder forums, promote direct communications with companies,
their officers and other representatives.").
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utility when viewing disclosures on social media through the SEC
regulatory lens. 14 0 For an issuer making disclosures on social media, key
questions include: (1) what information is being "pushed" to investors and
potential investors? (2) what information and data do investors and
potential investors request when utilizing "pull" technologies? (3) what
balance of "push" to "pull" is maintained in the "interactive" disclosures,
and is it a healthy balance between the two?
The above questions are a framework that builds upon traditional SEC
wisdom on framing disclosures via technology. The most successful
issuer-users of social media will be those who intimately know their
investors, market, and industry, and who can tailor a balance of push and
pull media to facilitate a mutually beneficial conversation. 141 The goals for
the issuer are to ultimately close a successful deal by marketing its
securities, while minimizing its fraud liabilities, and building a healthy
relationship with its investors. Goals for investors include receiving
accurate, up-to-date, instant, and interactive information from the issuer, so
that they can make reasonable and successful investment decisions. Both
issuers and investors utilize "push" and "pull" technologies throughout the
trading process.
Also useful is the "safe harbor" for forward looking information that
is provided in section 27A of the 1933 Act, discussed supra, which is
satisfied when a statement is forward looking and accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements. When crafting disclosures in social
media, it is best to always disclaim any statement that is forward looking as
such, and to provide cautionary statements that are fact specific to place
such statements within the "safe harbor." Such disclaimers may be more
challenging in some media fora that have character limits, such as Twitter,
140. For instance, many social media fora now blur the SEC's distinction between
"push" and "pull" technologies. On Twitter, for example, users can tweet "at" a given
account, which the SEC would categorize as a "pull" technology. Tweeters can also tweet
utilizing "hashtags," which allow a user to place their message within a similar stream of
tweets centered around the same content or "hashtag," which functions similarly to a "push"
technology, and could allow issuers to send information to a specific audience. See Getting
Started with Twitter, TWITTER.COM, https://support.twitter.com/articles/215585 [http://
perma.cc/9VKA 4L7C] (last visited May 9, 2016).
141. Finding this balance requires the issuer making the investors aware of its presence
on and use of various fora. The Investigative Report states:
The central focus of [the SEC's] inquiry [into whether a public company's website
use is permissible] is whether the company has made investors, the market, and
the media aware of the channels of distribution it expects to use, so these parties
know where to look for disclosures of material information about the company or
what they need to do to be in a position to receive this information.
Investigative Report, supra note 135, at 3.
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but not impossible. Many users of Twitter often provide internet links to
more detailed pages such as blogs, news reports, or YouTube videos.
Interested readers of a tweeter's "tweet" can then click the link and get the
full story. In the disclosure arena, such links could be invaluable for
issuers to provide the maximum amount of linked information and
disclaimer bang for their 140-character-buck. Yet, unfortunately, such
practices are still risky, as the courts have yet to rule on such a disclosure
strategy. 142
Yet another unanswered question is whether the SEC guidance
relating to entanglement or adoption of third party statements made on
company websites will translate well into the social media context. A
recent guide on social media disclosures cautions issuers away from
referencing and linking on social media to outside pages that do not
necessarily reflect the views of the issuer: "activity such as 'friending' a
securities research analyst on Facebook or tweeting an analyst's handle on
Twitter-as well as retweeting an analyst's tweet about the
company-could potentially be construed as adoption of the analyst's past
and future statements about a company or its securities."l43
Thus, it would be wise for issuers who insist upon having a social
media presence to be extremely wary or issue a policy prohibiting any sort
of endorsement or rebroadcasting of third party statements. If such actions
are taken, smart practices to remediate risk would be disclaiming that the
view is that of a third party and does not necessarily reflect the view of the
issuer, and providing the context of the facts surrounding the third party
statement. Additionally, issuers could provide some sort of editorial
viewpoint on the third party statement that makes clear that the issuer is not
adopting it, or disclaim that the issuer does not mean to endorse the full
history of an analyst or source of information, but means to endorse only
that information that is linked, shared, or rebroadcasted.1 4 4 In any media,
142.

G.

& FOERSTER, THE GUIDE TO SOCIAL
5 (2015), http://media.mofo.com/docs/PIdf/1 50615-GuideSocial-Media-Securities/9B4C44871BOC9784CFCAFE9D49521F5F/150615-Social-MediaSecurities-Guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/S6EY-GMYX] ("It remains uncertain whether a court
would determine that either [(1) linking to a web page, SEC report or press release or
(2) providing multiple-tweet disclosures] provides a means by which the forward-looking
statements are identified and are accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements.").
143. Id.
144. Such practices are based on SEC guidance on issuer responsibility for hyperlinked
information, which provides several "adoption" analysis factors: (1) context of the
hyperlink; (2) risk of confusion; and (3) presentation of the hyperlinked information. See
Use of Electronic Media, Securities Act Release No. 7856, Exchange Act Release No.
42,728, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,426, 65 Fed. Reg. 25843, 25848 (May 4,
2000). These factors are equally useful in the first party disclosure and third party
JAY
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the same substance, formality, and detail of information should reflect that
provided in a Prospectus, so that users or readers in one forum will not be
provided with incomplete or inconsistent information when compared with
all others.
Within the 506(c) context, issuers can take advantage of the lifting of
the general solicitation ban.1 4 5 Rule 506(c) issuers can take advantage of
general solicitation, which could have viral capital-raising effect on social
media if it complies with the conditions for advertising: (1) the issuer must
take reasonable steps to verify that the purchasers of the securities are
accredited investors; (2) all purchasers of securities must be accredited
investors, either because they fall within one of the enumerated categories
of persons that qualify as accredited investors or the issuer reasonably
believes that they qualify as accredited investors at the time of the sale of
securities; and (3) the issuer satisfies the conditions of Rule 501146 and
Rules 502(a)14 7 and 502(d).148 However, in order to make a general
solicitation, the issuer must take "reasonable steps to verify" that every
purchaser is an accredited investor, and just because all investors are in
fact, accredited investors, does not guarantee compliance. 14 9 "Someone can
be an 'Accredited Investor,' but if the issuer does not take reasonable steps
to verify the investor's status, the issuer does not qualify for the Rule
506(c) exemption."1 50 Thus, in order to get the benefits of general
solicitation, the issuer must undertake costly efforts to verify each investor.
This verification effort can be efficiently streamlined through the use of a
third party intermediary such as a registered broker-dealer, SEC-registered
investment adviser, licensed attorney, or certified public accountant to
review the investor's documents and verify that the investor is in fact an

disclosure contexts when hyperlinks are used to expand an individual social media
disclosure.
145. In contrast, issuers relying on 506(b) are still barred from making general
solicitations and must limit their solicitations to those potential investors within their close
network, and such investors must be accredited or sophisticated.
146. SEC Rule 501, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2015).
147. SEC Rule 502, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2015).
148. Id. § 230.502(d); E. Knox Proctor V & James F. Verdonik, Rule 506(c) Private
Offerings GeneralSolicitation andAdvertising Provisions, WARD & SMITH (Sept. 19, 2014),
http://www.wardandsmith.com/articles/rule-506c-private-offerings-general-solicitation-andadvertising-provisions [http://perma.cc/4M6F-EH63].
149. Id.
150. Id.
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accredited investor.1' Recently, intermediary platforms have arisen to
verify individual investor's accredited status.152
Another useful model for an issuer to monitor and control its
disclosures in the social media space is made by comparison to the SEC
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) National
Examination Risk Alertl 53 which outlines the SEC Staffs compliance
concerns with regards to the investment adviser industry, but its strategies
easily translate to issuers. In this risk alert, the SEC staff provides a
nonexclusive list of several compliance risk factors to assess social media
standards;15 5
(2) content
guidelines;1 54
(1) usage
effectiveness:
(3) monitoring;156 (4) frequency of monitoring;' 5 7 (5) approval of
content;' 5 8 (6) firm resources;1 59 (7) criteria for approving participation;1 60
15 1. Id.
152. Platforms such as Venovate allow issuers to take advantage of Rule 506(c)
offerings.

See Raising Capitalfor Alternative Opportunities, VENOVATE, http://welcome.

venovate.com/raising-capital-for-altematives [http://perma.cc/AM33-S2W8] (last visited
May 9, 2016). Venovate also provides a platform for Regulation A+ offerings. See Access
to Regulation A+, VENOVATE, http://welcome.venovate.com/why-venovate/ [https://perma.

cc/9TCS-SN5U] (last visited May 9, 2016).
153. Investment Adviser Use ofSocial Media, NAT'L EXAMINATION RiSK ALERT (Office

of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Washington,
D.C.), Jan. 4, 2012, at 1, https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/riskalert-socialmedia.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GZT9-BD5L]. This report particularly addresses the use of social media
with regards to Rule 206(4)-i under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Id.
154. "Usage guidelines" refer to general standards regarding use or prohibition of certain
social media fora based upon risk analysis, and the SEC suggests providing a list of
approved sites for disclosures to be made or providing a list of certain functionalities on

sites that are permitted or prohibited. See id at 3.
155. "Content standards" refer to content-focused controls with regards to disclosure
compliance, and suggests grouping disclosures by content and prohibiting or permitting
disclosures within these groups. See id.

156. "Monitoring" refers to the methods by which a firm provides oversight on various
social media platforms, and cautions that some platforms may provide limited access to
third parties which may complicate oversight policies. See id
157. "Frequency of monitoring" refers to the policies of how routine oversight of social
media disclosures are, and suggests that firms could take an approach that is either based
upon a routine schedule of monitoring (e.g., daily, weekly, biweekly), or could take a more
probability/contingency based method that focusses on monitoring responses to the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of contingencies that are likely to trigger social media

disclosures and monitoring their compliance in real time, but warns that post hoc monitoring
may not be appropriate in many circumstances. See id.

158. "Approval of content" refers to placing pre-approval controls on disclosures, such
as having a system that functions similar to a prior restraint on speech in the First
Amendment context. See id at 4.

159. "Firm resources" refers to the analysis a company must conduct prior to entering
the social media space to ensure that it has adequate resources to sufficiently monitor all
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(11) personal/
(8) training; 16 1 (9) certification; 162 (10) functionality; 16
professional sites; 164 (12) information security; 165 and (13) enterprise wide
sites.166 The list, while not exhaustive, can be used by issuers to assess its
disclosure risks and craft industry and firm-appropriate policies to manage
these risks.
CONCLUSION

The outset of this Comment posited that changes in technology and
business practices have made basic securities law principles obsolete since
the SEC formulated Regulation D's primary principles that: (1) businesses
cannot make general solicitations in private offerings, and (2) securities
rules should limit the ability of people to invest if they do not have
sufficient assets to lose money without the loss adversely impacting them
and their families.

disclosures on social media, and various cost-saving policies such as spot-sampling of
disclosures, or using lexicon-based search methodologies to ensure compliance of its
disclosures. See id
160. "Criteria for Approving Participation" refers to analysis of the individual social
media platform to assess compatibility between the platform's various functionalities and
the company's compliance risk policies. See id. Applicable functionality assessments
include "the reputation of the site, the site's privacy policy, the ability to remove third-party
posts, controls on anonymous posting and the advertising practices of any social media site
that the firm or its IARs or solicitors use to conduct business." See id.
161. "Training" refers to providing training amongst employees and disclosure staff to
promote and educate about compliance policies and how to avoid risk. See id.
162. "Certification" refers to adding a requirement that disclosure staff satisfy certain
certification procedures that include training or education on compliance strategies and
policies. See id.
163. "Functionality" refers to monitoring the social media platform for updates in
functionalities and programming to ensure ongoing compliance with the company's
disclosure risk policies. See id. Such a team would assess whether the platform allows for
the ability to control and accurately assess its risk. See id
164. "Personal/Professional Sites" refers to employees utilizing their own personal social
media pages to disclose professional information that could be imported as a disclosure of
the company. See id. at 5. Companies can create policies to control the types of company
communications that are permitted on sites that are not operated, supervised or sponsored by
the company. See id
165. "Information Security" refers to policies related to company or employee presence
on sites that pose elevated information security risks. See id. The goals for companies
include protecting its information and information systems from unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modification, perusal, inspection, recording, or destruction. See id.
The use of firewalls and secure passwords is contemplated by this factor. See id.
166. "Enterprise Wide Sites" refers to the management of all sites associated with a
company to ensure internal compliance across sites. See id.
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These rules promote secret communications among a small group of
elite issuers, institutional investors, and wealthy individual investors in a
culture where most information and communications are now openly
shared and everyone has the ability to participate in the conversation if they
have a mobile device or a modem.
In response to this disconnection between Regulation D principles on
the one hand and technology and modem business practices on the other
hand, the JOBS Act and many state legislatures have restructured securities
laws to promote more open communications to a broader audience (called
the crowd). It has accomplished this by revising old exemptions from
registration and by creating new exemptions in the form of Rule 506(c)
issued under Title II of the JOBS Act, section 4 (a)(6) created by Title III
of the JOBS Act, Regulation A+ issued under Title IV of the JOBS Act,
and state crowdfunding laws that are designed to be used in conjunction
with SEC Rules 147 and 504, which the SEC has proposed amending to
make state crowdfunding laws usable by more businesses.
All of these crowdfunding exemptions from registration permit issuers
to use inexpensive technology to substantially reduce the cost of
communicating with large numbers of potential investors. The exponential
growth of internet and social media use during the past two decades
demonstrate two basic facts that securities laws must deal with-as the cost
of communicating decreases and user interfaces make technology easier to
use, more people will communicate with one another and people will
change what they say and how they say it to adapt to the type of technology
they use to communicate.
The focus on the new freedom to communicate reminds us that the
heart of the 1933 Act was never about how people communicated with one
another. Communication tools always change. Therefore, rules about the
tools people use to communicate must always change or become irrelevant.
The core of the Securities Act regulates the substance of what is being
communicated.
Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act and section 10 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 create liability (subject to certain defenses), if an
issuer makes any "untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."l 6 7
Sometimes whether a statement is untrue or misleading and sometimes is
an issue. In other cases, the issue may be whether a statement or omission
related to a fact. In most cases, however, the primary issues are whether
facts are material.
167. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 12, 48 Stat. 74, 84.
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That is why the key to designing any disclosure strategy is to ask and
answer: "What is 'material' about this business and this offering?"
Materiality issues generally break down into two basic categories. How is
this business similar to other successful businesses and similar to other
How is this business different from other
unsuccessful businesses?
from other unsuccessful businesses?
and
different
successful businesses
Answering these questions helps to both develop the issuer's sales pitch
about why people should invest and the issuer's disclosure strategy about
what securities laws require issuers to disclose to investors.
None of the new crowdfunding exemptions from registration weaken
these basic disclosure principles and some of the crowdfunding exemptions
supplement these disclosure principles by adding more specific disclosure
requirements about financial statements. Recognizing that intentional
securities fraud is perpetrated by a relatively small group of criminals who
repeatedly and intentionally violate securities laws, the new crowdfunding
exemptions specifically exclude issuers that are affiliated with what are
commonly called "bad actors."
Most securities disclosure violations are unintentional and are made
by business people who simply make mistakes. Therefore, keeping out the
"bad actors" is only the first step to ensuring disclosure compliance. The
challenge of making the new crowdfunding exemptions work will be to
reduce the number of disclosure mistakes issuers make.
Disclosure strategy is like many other legal issues: a mixture of law
and facts. If the facts change, issuers need a different strategy for how to
Important facts that affect how
comply with the legal requirements.
disclosure rules apply require businesses that use the different
crowdfunding exemptions to raise capital to consider: (1) who is
communicating (what are the specific things that are important to this
particular business); (2) with whom they are communicating (what level of
understanding do targeted investors have); and (3) how they are
communicating (how do you blend securities law disclosure requirements
with communications styles that are effective for the type of
communications tools being used). Low risk can mean low cost and low
liability exposure, but also low reward. High risk can mean high cost and
high liability exposure, but also high reward. Ultimately, an issuer must
have a sense of self-actualization that allows it to find the right mixture of
risk versus reward in its formation and utilization of disclosure strategies
and policies.
Addressing these issues requires more complicated analysis for
crowdfunding offerings than for traditional private placements, because
securities law compliance can be expensive, many of the new issuers that
will be conducting crowdfunding offerings will have low compliance
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budgets and many potential investors will lack experience evaluating
investments in private businesses. The bar that issuers must clear for their
disclosures is not lower because the issuer is inexperienced or cannot afford
good disclosure advice. Consequently, issuers must find ways to make
disclosures more cost effective. For some, this could mean sticking to
more conventional, traditional, cheaper, and safer options.
Inevitably, issuers will try to rely on standard disclosure forms to
lower disclosure costs and liabilities. That can be a useful start, but it is
difficult to create forms that both sell the offering and satisfy disclosure
requirements, because investors usually want to know what is different
about the particular business. Why will this particular business succeed
when other businesses in the same industry fail? Disclosure forms are
much better at describing similarities than differences. If issuers only
describe how much they and other businesses are alike, issuers will
undercut their sales message.
Effectively dealing with these complications in crowdfunding
offerings will require issuers to streamline their sales messages and
disclosures to focus on the most important things investors need to know
about their businesses. This will require issuers to be disciplined in their
sales messages. Issuers must resist the temptation to try to be all things to
all investors. Less really can be more.
The scope of the issuer's duty not to misstate material facts and to
avoid omitting material facts that make prior statements of material facts
misleading to investors is defined by the claims issuers make about their
businesses. Fewer claims generally translates into fewer material facts that
investors must evaluate, fewer opportunities to misstate material facts and
fewer omissions that can cause statements to be misleading. Understanding
this basic fact is the key to issuers being able to communicate their sales
messages in ways that focus investors on why they should invest, satisfy
securities law disclosure requirements and pdrmit issuers to stay within
budget.
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